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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 04-2060
                        
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LEROY TURNER, JR.,
                       Appellant
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Criminal No. 99-cr-00014-4)
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 18, 2005
Before:  RENDELL, ALDISERT, and MAGILL*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : April 29, 2005)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Leroy Turner pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and, on 
                                     
*Honorable Frank J. Magill, Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
    Turner has not challenged his conviction.1
2
July 7, 1999, was sentenced by the District Court to 188 months’ imprisonment.  The
sentence was the maximum of the applicable 151-188 month range based on a total
offense level of 29 (Turner’s plea stipulated to a base offense level of 34; he received a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a two-level reduction for minor
participation) and Criminal History Category VI.  
On appeal, Turner argues that Amendment 640 to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 2002 and capped the base offense level of
minor participant drug offenders at 30, should apply to him.  Turner urges that
Amendment 640 is a clarifying, as opposed to substantive, amendment, and thus should
apply retroactively; therefore, he requests that his sentence be vacated and the case
remanded for new sentencing that reflects the change effected by Amendment 640.  
Turner also challenges his sentence under United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 160
L. Ed. 2d 621, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).  Having concluded that the sentencing issues
Appellant raises are best determined by the District Court in the first instance, we will
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker.   Before1
doing so, however, we will address the guideline issue raised by Turner so as to provide
guidance to the District Court on remand as to its proper application.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.  United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d
    Although, following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker,2
__ U.S. __, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), application of the guidelines is not
mandatory, district courts must still consult the guidelines in making sentencing
determinations.  Therefore, it remains necessary for this Court to resolve Turner’s claim
regarding the correct interpretation of the guidelines. 
3
171, 177 (3d Cir. 2001).  2
It is an established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing
guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or
comment in place at the time of sentencing.  Where, however, the amendment effects a
substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new
provision.  See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); United States
v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 4991 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Isabel v. United States, 980
F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that this is the rule in “virtually all circuits”).  The
government contends that Amendment 640 is substantive, not clarifying, and that,
accordingly, it should not apply retroactively; thus, it argues, Appellant’s sentence
appropriately reflects the applicable guidelines.  The government notes that Amendment
640 is not listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (Nov. 2002) among the more than twenty
amendments deemed to have retroactive effect, but also concedes that its absence from
the list is not dispositive – a sentencing court may still reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment to give effect to later changes if it first considers the relevant sentencing
factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and additionally concludes that such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.  18
    But see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a) (“If none of the amendments listed in subsection (c) is3
applicable, a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) is not consistent with this policy statement and thus is not authorized.”);
Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (“Eligibility for consideration under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) is triggered only by an amendment listed in subsection (c) that lowers the
applicable guideline range.”).  
4
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  See also Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 491 (“Yet the law is clear that
‘courts can give retroactive effect to a clarifying (as opposed to substantive) amendment
regardless of whether it is listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10’” (quoting United States v.
Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995))).  3
In Marmolejos we held an amendment stating that sentences would be calculated
with reference to the amount of drugs actually delivered – rather than by reference to the
weight of the drug sale he had negotiated – to be clarifying and to lend resolve to an
ambiguity.  Here, however, Amendment 640 is not consistent with the guideline
commentary in effect at the time of Turner’s sentencing.  See United States v. Bertoli, 40
F.3d 1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that courts must look to see “whether, as a
matter of construction, the guideline and commentary in effect at that time is really
consistent with the amended manual”).  Before Amendment 640, the base offense level
for an offender like Turner was that “specified in the Drug Quantity Table” whereas after
adoption of Amendment 640, the base offense level was that  “specified in the Drug
Quantity Table ... except that if the defendant receives an adjustment [for mitigating
role], the base offense level under this subsection should not be more than 30.”  Though
5this amendment clearly responds to concerns over the harshness of drug sentencing for
those who play minimal roles, it does not “fill a void” or “resolve an ambiguity”; rather,
it adds a substantive component.  Therefore, we conclude Amendment 640 of the
guidelines is substantive and not to be given retroactive effect.  
In light of the foregoing we will vacate and remand for resentencing in accordance
with Booker and this opinion. 
